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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the insurance industry 
experienced high losses from “deep-pocket defendants” with 
disproportionately high jury awards.1  These “deep-pocket 
defendants” were often medical doctors and big businesses. The 
industry responded to the losses by increasing premiums or 
refusing to renew existing high-risk premiums. The industry 
feared it would go under as a result of closing businesses and the 
relocation of doctors to areas with lower premiums. In response 
to this self-labeled “crisis,” laws were implemented which 
restricted a plaintiff’s rights to a full recovery in hopes of 
reducing insurance premiums; however, this result has not 
always been achieved.2 The enactment of these laws began the 
wave of what is most commonly referred to as “Tort Reform.”3 
                                                                 
1 Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic 
Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several 
Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 647 (1988).  
2 Allyson Fish, Noneconomic Damage Caps In Medical Malpractice 
Litigation: Finding A Solution That Satisfies All Affected Parties, 17 
NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL'Y 135, 140 (2012). 
3 Michael P. Allen, A Survey and Some Commentary on Federal “Tort 
Reform,” 39 AKRON L. REV. 909 (2006).  
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The threat of limitations on a plaintiff’s opportunity to 
be fully compensated for injuries caused through no fault of their 
own has been widespread over the years.4  For decades, both 
state and federal governments have proposed and adopted laws 
that limit the amount of money a plaintiff can recover.5  
Generally, the caps are placed on noneconomic and punitive 
damages.  Noneconomic damages are those awarded to 
compensate the plaintiff for damages such as pain and suffer ing 
and loss of enjoyment. They are more speculative in nature due 
to the uncertainty in how they can be calculated. Punitive 
damages are those awarded to punish a defendant for 
wrongdoing and deter others from acting in the same manner.   
In regards to the caps on noneconomic and punitive 
damages, states are split not only on what actual cap should be 
applied but also to the constitutionality of such caps.6 Section II 
will discuss how Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama courts have 
handled the caps and the challenges that have been made.  
Section III will address how the states have attempted to 
limit economic damages. Economic damages are damages 
awarded to cover medical bills, lost wages, and other 
calculatable damages and have not, up to this point, been 
susceptible to caps. While no statutory caps have been placed on 
economic damages, proponents for such limitations have 
attempted to restrict economic damages in other ways. Some 
states have limited or completely abrogated the Collateral 
Source Rule, while others have attempted to expand narrowly 
tailored state laws.7 The Collateral Source rule prevents 
evidence of collateral payments from affecting a plaintiff’s right 
to recover damages.8 Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama have all 
                                                                 
4 Id. 
5 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-39-101-104 (West, Westlaw through 2018 
Second Reg. Session); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-12-5.1; 51-13-1 (West, 
Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and Spec. Session); ALA. CODE § 6-5-544 
(2018). 
6 Sue Ganske, Noneconomic Damages Caps in Wrongful Death Medical 
Malpractice Cases – Are They Constitutional?, 14 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 
31, 51 (2015). 
7 Danielle A. Daigle, The Collateral Source Rule in Alabama: A Practical 
Approach to Future Applications of the Statutes Abrogating the Doctrine, 
53 ALA. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (2002). 
8 2 STUART M. SPEISER, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:16 (Monique C. 
M. Leahy et al. eds., 2018). 
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taken different approaches to the collateral source rule, ranging 
from strict adherence to complete abrogation. 
II. CAPS ON DAMAGES AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
STATUTES IN TENNESSEE, GEORGIA, AND ALABAMA 
Legislative “caps” on damages are statutory limitations 
on the amount of money a plaintiff may be awarded in a civil 
suit.  Most caps are placed on noneconomic and punitive 
damages.  The trend of implementing statutorily imposed caps 
on noneconomic damages began with the California Legislature 
in 1975 when it passed the Medical Injury Compensation 
Reform Act (MICRA).9 In response to the rapid state-wide 
increase in insurance premiums resulting from large 
malpractice jury awards, MICRA set a $250,000 cap on 
noneconomic awards in medical malpractice claims.10 The 
maximum amount of noneconomic damages a plaintiff could 
recover would be $250,000 regardless of the severity of the 
negligence or injury. After California’s enactment of MICRA, 
several states followed suit, and by 2005, over half of the states 
had implemented legislation creating caps on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice claims.11 
One argument in favor of the legislatively placed caps 
refers to the rising insurance premiums due to large malpractice 
jury awards.12 It is argued that high insurance premiums place 
the state in a “malpractice crisis.”13 Proponents for the caps 
argue that lower jury awards and lower insurance payouts will 
result in lower insurance premiums, which would provide 
relief to the to the state from this “malpractice crisis.”14 For this 
theory to be correct, it must be assumed that the liability 
                                                                 
9 Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, ch. 1 & 2, 1975 Cal. Stat. 
3949-4007. 
10 Fish, supra note 2, at 137; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 1016 of 2018 Reg. Session). 
11 Fish, supra note 2, at 137 (Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin). 
12 Id. at 139. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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insurers would take it upon themselves to lower the premiums 
due to their new protection by the cap. This assumption is far-
fetched. If there is any doubt as to whether the courts will 
uphold the cap, the liability insurers will generally wait for the 
constitutionality challenge to be resolved before taking any 
action.15 This delay creates a very troubling scenario for 
plaintiffs where their potential recovery has been limited and 
the proposed purpose of lower insurance premiums has not 
come to fruition.  
Those against the implementation of caps argue that the 
caps do not lower insurance premiums and point to California’s 
continued increase in premiums despite the passing of 
MICRA.16  In fact, the California insurance premiums 
continued to rise until 1988, and only upon the passing of 
broader insurance reform legislation did those premiums start 
to decrease.17  
Additionally, those opposed to caps often point out the 
fact that Minnesota has the lowest insurance premiums 
“despite the fact that the state has no statutory noneconomic 
damage cap or medical malpractice insurance crisis.”18 This 
casts doubt on the argument that the limitations are a large 
factor in reduced insurance premiums.  Acknowledging that 
other factors besides a lack of damage caps in Minnesota likely 
need to be considered, the fact that no cap exists is a persuasive 
indication that caps are not required, as argued by some, to 
lower premium rates.19   
Opponents most often argue that the caps violate a 
constitutional right, more specifically, a citizen’s right to a jury 
trial.20 The Seventh Amendment creates the right to a jury trial 
in civil suits, specifically stating that “no fact tried by a jury 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States.”21 The theory is that the limit placed on the award 
undercuts the jury’s ability to make the determination by 
                                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 140. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 138. 
20 J. Chase Bryan, et al., Are Non-Economic Caps Constitutional?, 80 
DEF. COUNS. J. 154, 154 (2013). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  
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reducing the award, essentially abrogating the advantage of 
having a neutral body determine damages.22 
The limits on the caps and the basis and results of the 
constitutional challenges differ from state to state.23 As of 2013, 
twenty-nine states had adopted some form of statutory caps on 
non-economic damages.24 Of those twenty-nine states, the 
constitutionality of those caps has been upheld in seventeen 
states.25  The below subsections discuss the statutory caps put 
in place, the constitutional challenges to the caps, and how the 
courts have handled those challenges within the Southern states 
of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama. 
A. TENNESSEE CAPS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY 
CHALLENGES 
Prior to October 1, 2011, a Tennessee plaintiff could 
recover for an endless amount of both economic and 
noneconomic damages without being subject to caps on that 
award.26  Much changed when the Tennessee Legislature 
enacted the Tennessee Civil Justice Act in 2011. While economic 
damages remain recoverable without limitation, statutory caps 
have been imposed on noneconomic damages in all civil 
actions, including health care liability claims.27 The Legislature 
justified the limits as necessary for Tennessee’s economic 
development.28  The caps limited recovery of noneconomic 
damages to seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars 
($750,000) in non-catastrophic situations and one million 
                                                                 
22 Fish, supra note 2, at 145. 
23 Ganske, supra note 6, at 51. 
24 Bryan, et al., supra note 20, at 157. 
25 Id. 
26 John W. Elder & Joshua R. Walker, The Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 
2011, 47 TENN. B.J. 20, 22 (2011). 
27 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (West, Westlaw through 2018 
Second Reg. Session); Healthcare Liability Actions Under the 
Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 12-58 
(2012). 
28 Clark v. Cain, No. 12C1147, 2015 WL 1137546, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 
March 9, 2015). 
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dollars ($1,000,000) in catastrophic situations.29  
Many personal injury cases never reach high enough 
values to be subjected to the caps. However, when a 
defendant’s actions and the resulting injuries are severe enough 
to warrant such high awards, it begs the question of whether a 
plaintiff can be fully “made whole” when the amount of 
damages available is automatically reduced.30  
Tennessee’s 2011 wave of tort reform also created caps 
on punitive damage awards. In order to prevail on a punitive 
damage award, the court must first, in a bifurcated trial, 
determine whether to make an award of compensatory 
damages and determine whether there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant “acted maliciously, intentionally, 
fraudulently, or recklessly.”31 It is also determined whether the 
defendant’s conduct fits one of the statutory exceptions to the 
caps on punitive damages.32 If compensatory damages are 
awarded and the defendant was found to have acted with 
malice, the court will promptly hold an evidentiary hearing and 
have the jury determine the amount of punitive damages, if 
any.33 Unless one of the statutory exceptions apply, the amount 
actually awarded to the plaintiff cannot exceed five hundred 
thousand dollars ($500,000) or two (2) times the total amount of 
compensatory damages awarded.34  
It cannot be argued that caps on punitive damages 
prevent a plaintiff from being made whole due to the nature of 
                                                                 
29 § 29-39-102(a)(2) and (c) (Westlaw) (catastrophic is statutorily 
defined as “(1) spinal cord injury resulting in paraplegia or 
quadriplegia; (2) amputation of two (2) hands, two (2) feed, or one 
(1) of each; (3) third degree burns [covering 40% or more of the body 
or face]; or (4) wrongful death of a parent leaving a [minor surviving 
child(ren) to whom the parent had lawful rights over]”). 
30 Fish, supra note 2, at 138. 
31 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 
Second Reg. Session). 
32 § 29-39-104(a)(7) (Westlaw) (those exceptions include specific 
intent to inflict serious physical injury; the altering, destroying or 
concealing of records in an attempt to evade liability; and if the 
defendant was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or an intoxicant 
when the injury was caused). 
33 § 29-39-104 (Westlaw). 
34 § 29-39-104(a)(5) (Westlaw). 
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deterrence that embodies punitive damages.35  Simply put, 
punitive damages are awarded in addition to compensatory 
damages in order to punish the defendant for egregious and 
intentional behavior to the extent that the defendant and others 
would learn by example and refrain from acting in such ways 
in the future. These may be awarded only after it has been 
decided that the plaintiff can be “made whole” with an award 
of compensatory damages.36 Lacking the “made whole” 
defense, proponents against caps on punitive damages needed 
another way to challenge the validity of the statute.  
A stronger alternative argument against caps on 
damages is one that attacks the constitutionality of the specific 
statutes. In Tennessee, a few cases have attempted to challenge 
the Tennessee Civil Justice Act on the grounds that it violates a 
citizen’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.37 
Challengers argue that the automatic reduction in 
awards divests a jury of its power “to decide facts and 
determine damages thereby denying plaintiff [the]right to a 
jury trial.”38 This point was argued in Clark v. Cain, a case 
involving a motor vehicle accident wherein the plaintiff alleged 
$22,500,000 in pain and suffering damages.39 The plaintiff also 
alleged that any legislative limitation prohibiting the recovery 
of such an amount was unconstitutional.40 When the 
defendants moved for partial summary judgment seeking to 
cap the award at the statutory amount, they responded to the 
constitutionality challenge by arguing that the issue was not yet 
ripe for decision.41 The defendants urged that the “plaintiffs 
had not yet been, nor might never be, awarded noneconomic 
damages that were in excess of the cap,” thus the cap might not 
                                                                 
35 Andrea Moore Hawkins, Balancing Act: Public Policy and Punitive 
Damages Caps, 49 S.C. L. REV. 293, 296 (1998). 
36 § 29-39-104(a)(2) (Westlaw). 
37Clark v. Cain, No. 12C1147, 2015 WL 1137546, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 
March 9, 2015); Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 147 F. 
Supp. 3d 694 (W.D. Tenn. 2015).  
38 Bryan, et al., supra note 20, at 155. 
39Clark, 2015 WL 1137546, at *1. 
40 Id. at *3 (plaintiff alleged the statutory caps violated a citizen’s 
right to a trial by jury). 
41 Clark v. Cain, 479 S.W.3d 830, 831 (Tenn. 2015). 
60                     6 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2019) 
be applicable.42  Essentially, the defendants were arguing that a 
plaintiff cannot claim a statute is unconstitutional when it has 
not yet been determined by a court that the statute would apply 
to the situation at hand.  
The court denied the defendants’ motion and disagreed 
as to the issue of ripeness.43  In making this determination, the 
court went through an extensive analysis of construing 
constitutional issues and determined that the right to a jury trial 
is a fundamental right; therefore, strict scrutiny applied.44 In 
applying the strict scrutiny test, the court found that the State 
failed to show that the economic development of the State was 
more important than a citizen’s right to a jury trial.45 In fact, 
after reviewing the legislative history of the Act, the court 
found nothing to support the fact that caps on non-economic 
damages were beneficial for economic development in 
Tennessee.46 The opinion centered around the rationale that if 
the caps fail to further the purpose for which they were 
implemented, then they should be struck down.   
When the court ruled that the right to a jury trial had 
been violated, it quoted Chief Justice Marshall in the Marbury 
v. Madison opinion where he stated that “[t]he very essence of 
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to 
claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an 
injury.”47 In applying that protection of the laws to the case at 
hand, the court concluded that damages were an essential part 
of a tort action, and as such, any attempt to alter an award that 
had been determined by a jury would be contradictory to the 
right to trial by jury.48 
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs in Clark, the defendants 
filed an appeal alleging that the trial court erred in holding the 
statute unconstitutional.49 Both parties agreed that the 
Tennessee Supreme Court should resolve the constitutionality 
                                                                 
42 Id. 
43Clark, 2015 WL 1137546, at *4. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at *7.  
46 Id. at *8. 
47 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
48 Clark, 2015 WL 1137546, at *6. 
49 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (West, Westlaw through 2018 
Second Reg. Session). 
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issue surrounding the caps on noneconomic damages; 
however, the Court disagreed.50 The Court declined to decide 
the constitutionality of the statute, holding that the issue was 
not ripe to be decided at the summary judgment stage.51 The 
Court explained that the role of Tennessee courts is to decide 
issues that actually exist at the time they are being disputed, 
and because an award of damages in excess of the cap had not 
yet been awarded, it was unknown as to whether the cap would 
even apply.52 The opinion went on to say that because it is still 
an open issue as to whether the cap will even apply, the trial 
court “acted prematurely in considering . . . [the] constitutional 
challenge at this [early] stage of the proceedings.”53 
Shortly after the Court declined to rule on the 
constitutionality of the noneconomic caps, a diversity case 
coming from the Western District of Tennessee, Lindenberg v. 
Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., presented a similar situation.54 This 
case involved a dispute over a life insurance policy payout 
involving alleged bad faith on the part of the defendant 
insurance company. After the court ruled that the insurance 
company owed the plaintiff $350,000 plus interest in actual 
damages, a jury found clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant acted recklessly and awarded punitive damages in 
the amount of $3,000,000.55  
The defendant had filed a Motion for Judgment as a 
Matter of Law as to the award of punitive damages.56 The 
defendant argued that the Tennessee punitive damages cap 
applied and that the plaintiff was only entitled to the statutory 
maximum of $500,000.57 The plaintiff responded and alleged 
that the cap was unconstitutional, but argued that if the statute 
                                                                 
50 Clark v. Cain, 479 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Tenn. 2015). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 831 (quoting West v. Schofield, 468 S.W.3d 482, 490 (Tenn. 
2015)). 
53 Clark, 479 S.W.3d at 832. 
54 Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 3d 694 
(W.D.Tenn. 2015) 
55 Id. at 699. 
56 Id. 
57 Lindenberg, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 704; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104 
(West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Reg. Session). 
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was constitutional, they would be entitled to $700,000.58 The 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Certification of Questions to the 
Tennessee Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the 
statutory caps on punitive damages. After denying the 
defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and 
granting the plaintiff’s Motion for a Certified Question, the trial 
court decided not to rule on the amount of punitive damages to 
be awarded until hearing back from the Tennessee Supreme 
Court. 
Again, the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to 
answer the certified question as to whether the caps on punitive 
damages were violative of a citizen’s right to a jury trial.59 The 
Court stated that the real issue at hand was whether a plaintiff 
could be awarded a “common law remedy of punitive damages 
in addition to the statutory remedy of the bad faith penalty,” 
and because such issue had not been certified by the trial court 
and had not yet been decided, “it would be imprudent for [the 
Court] to answer the certified questions concerning the 
constitutionality of the statutory caps on punitive damages in 
this case in which the question of the availability of those 
damages in the first instance has not been and cannot be 
answered by this Court.”60  
Once the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to answer 
the certified question, the trial court took it upon itself to answer 
the issue presented by the Court regarding the availability of 
both statutory bad faith damages and punitive damages.61 
Citing Riad v. Erie Ins. Exchange, the court noted that a 
plaintiff’s damages were not limited to the statutory bad faith 
damages and, acting on precedent, ruled that both remedies 
were available for the plaintiff. 62  
In analyzing the constitutionality of the punitive 
damage caps, the court found that the right to a jury trial does 
not include the right to a specific legal remedy.63 The court 
                                                                 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 Riad v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 436 S.W.3d 256, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2013). 
63 Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 711, 719 
(W.D. Tenn. 2016); See also Dowlen v. Fitch, 264 S.W.2d 824, 825 
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essentially was telling the plaintiff that because the right to 
punitive damages is not a vested right in a citizen, that it cannot 
be said that capping the availability of punitive damages can be 
in violation of a constitutional right.  
The court found that the caps were constitutional and as 
such, awarded the plaintiff punitive damages in the amount of 
$700,000, which is reflective of the statutory maximum allowed 
within the statute.64 
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s lack of decision on the 
issue along with the lack of existing case law on the subject only 
furthers the ambiguity as to the constitutionality of the caps on 
damages.  A lack of a decision on the matter essentially equates 
to a decision upholding the constitutionality, as the caps are still 
in place.  However, this lack of decision also indicates that the 
Court has left the door open for future challenges.  
B. GEORGIA CAPS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY CHALLENGES 
Similar to the Tennessee Civil Justice Act, Georgia 
implemented the Georgia Tort Reform Act of 1987 and later 
amended it in 2005. The Act placed a cap on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases at $350,000.65  The Act 
was put in place to help with what the Legislature called a crisis 
involving reduced access to and increasing cost of liability 
insurance which resulted in the potential for decreased access 
to healthcare by Georgia citizens.66 
In 2010, the cap on noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice cases was challenged.67  In Atlanta Oculoplastic 
Surgery P.C. v. Nestlehutt, the jury awarded the plaintiff 
$900,000 in noneconomic damages after having permanent 
disfigurement resulting from a procedure performed by the 
                                                                 
(Tenn. 1954) (holding that the cases ruling a person has no vested 
right in a particular remedy are abundant). 
64 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(5)(A) (West, Westlaw through 
2018 Second Reg. Session). 
65 GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-13-1 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and 
Spec. Sessions). 
66 2005 Ga. Laws p. 1. 
67 Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 
(Ga. 2010). 
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defendant medical provider.68 The plaintiff moved to have the 
cap deemed unconstitutional.69 The trial court held that the 
statute violated Georgia’s Constitution by encroaching on the 
right to a jury trial.70 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed on 
the basis that at the time of the adoption of the Georgia 
Constitution of 1798, medical malpractice and the right to a trial 
by jury were incorporated into the Georgia Constitution.71 The 
Court concluded that the right to have a jury determine a 
plaintiff’s damages is included as a constitutional right, and 
held that the statute infringed on the right to have the jury 
determine damages by undermining the very basic function of 
the jury.72 “If the legislature may constitutionally cap recovery 
at $350,000, there is no discernible reason why it could not cap 
the recovery at some other figure, perhaps $50,000, or $1,000, or 
$1.”73 The Georgia Supreme Court ruled the statute 
unconstitutional with the release of the Atlanta Oculoplastic 
Surgery opinion which remains good law to date.74 
The Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery opinion distinguished 
caps on noneconomic damages from caps on punitive 
damages.75 Punitive damages cannot violate the right to trial by 
jury because they are “not really facts tried by the jury.”76 
Because punitive damages are so deterring and punishing in 
nature and not used to compensate the plaintiff, a cap cannot 
be said to be a violation of the Seventh Amendment.77  
While not violative of the Seventh Amendment, caps on 
                                                                 
68 Id. at 220. 
69 § 51-13-1 (Westlaw 2018). 
70 Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery P.C., 691 S.E.2d at 220 (The trial court 
also ruled that statute encroached upon the governmental separation 
of powers and the right to equal protection. The Georgia Supreme 
Court affirmed based on their finding of an encroachment upon the 
right to trial by jury). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 222-23 (quoting Feltner v. Columbia Pictures TV, Inc., 523 
U.S. 340, 353 (1998). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-12-5.1(c) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. 
and Spec. Sessions); See also State v. Mosley, 436 S.E. 2d 632 (Ga. 
1993). 
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punitive damages have been deemed constitutionally invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause when it comes to products 
liability claims.78 Specifically, the district court in McBride 
ruled that OCGA § 51-12-5.1(e)(1), which limits a plaintiff to a 
single punitive recovery regardless of the number of causes of 
actions, was “null and void in that it violates the equal 
protection and due process clauses of the Georgia and federal 
constitutions.”79 The court reasoned that the single award 
“unconstitutionally discriminate[d] between plaintiffs in 
products liability actions because it would deny any awards to 
all but the first plaintiff whose claim arose out a particular act 
or omission.”80 Additionally, it would also discriminate 
between plaintiffs in products liability cases versus plaintiffs in 
non-products liability cases who are not limited to the single 
award.81 The court also ruled that section (e)(2) was also 
constitutionally invalid under the Takings Clause, as it 
mandated for 75% of the total recovery in products liability 
cases to be given to the State.82 
Interestingly, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to 
follow McBride when it upheld OCGA § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) as 
completely constitutional.83 The Court in Mack Trusts, Inc. v. 
Conkle upheld the constitutionality of OCGA § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) 
and (e)(2) holding that “[a] plaintiff has no vested property 
right in the amount of punitive damages which can be awarded 
in any case, and the legislature may lawfully regulate the 
amount of punitive damages which can be awarded.”84 
This opinion begs the question of how far the legislature 
can go when it comes to caps on punitive damages.  It has been 
established that there is no constitutional right to an award of 
punitive damages, which is what allows case law decisions like 
Mack Trucks and legislatively regulated limitations on 
                                                                 
78 McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990). 
79 Id. at 1579. 
80 2 BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND 
LITIGATION § 21:14 (2d ed. 2017).  
81 Id.  
82 McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1579. 
83 ERIC JAMES HERTZ, MARK D. LINK, GEORGIA PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2-
12 (2d. ed. 2017). 
84 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993). 
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damages.85 With the free range the Georgia Court has given to 
the legislature, it begs the question of whether eventually, this 
could lead to the complete abrogation of punitive damages. 
C. ALABAMA CAPS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY CHALLENGES 
Like Tennessee and Georgia, Alabama has adopted a 
series of tort reform legislation, including a cap of $400,000 on 
noneconomic damages in health care liability cases.86  
In 1991, the $400,000 cap was challenged as being 
violative of a citizen’s right to a jury trial.87 The plaintiff was 
awarded $600,000 in noneconomic damages arising from a 
medical malpractice claim.88  The trial court, pursuant to the 
statutory cap, reduced the award to the maximum amount 
allowed of $400,000. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the 
constitutionality of the cap.89   
When the Alabama Supreme Court ruled the cap 
unconstitutional, it reiterated the Court’s prior rulings, which 
cautioned against altering a jury’s award of damages unless the 
determination was influenced by “bias, passion, prejudice, 
corruption, or other improper motive.”90 The Court was 
influenced by the notion that noneconomic damages are 
difficult to calculate, and  acknowledged that “[t]he jury's role 
in fixing the amount of damages has been regarded as 
particularly sacrosanct in cases involving damages not 
susceptible of precise measurement.”91 Because there was no 
evidence that the jury’s assessment of damages was flawed by 
bias, prejudice, corruption, or fraud, the Court ruled that a 
jury’s determination of damages is protected by the right to a 
jury trial, and thus, any statute preventing that jury’s award 
                                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Leonard J. Nelson, III, et al., Medical Malpractice Reform in Three 
Southern States, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 69, 114 (2008). 
87 Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So.2d 156, 158 (Ala. 1991). 
88 Id. at 157. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 161. 
91 Id. at 160-61; See also Alabama Power Co. v. Mosley, 318 So.2d 260, 
266 (Ala. 1975); Austin v. Tennessee Biscuit Co., 52 So.2d 190 (Ala. 
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from being given as is offends the Alabama Constitution. 92 
The above discussion regarding the placement of and 
the constitutional challenges to caps on damages only discusses 
caps on noneconomic and punitive damages, because the 
majority of the caps are not applicable to economic damages.  
One way insurance companies and insurance defense attorneys 
are attempting to get around the lack of caps on economic 
damages is by attempting to limit the collateral source rule.  The 
next section discusses what the collateral source rule is and how 
the insurance industry is attempting to limit the rule both in its 
application of calculating damages as well as from an 
evidentiary standpoint.  
III. COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
When injured in tort, a plaintiff may receive 
collateral payments from third parties, such as insurance 
companies, who have no connection with the defendant.93 
This often occurs through health insurance companies 
when they pay for medical services, or auto insurance 
companies when they pay you for your property damage. 
Pursuant to the rule, evidence that the plaintiff has 
received benefits from third parties who have no relation 
to the defendant will not be used to reduce the total 
recovery received by the plaintiff.94 Rules like this have 
been implemented in every state within the United 
States.95 
The collateral source rule is a multipurpose rule 
that is applicable to both damages and the rules of 
evidence.96 Not only does it prohibit reduced recovery by 
payments from collateral sources, but it also prohibits the 
introduction of evidence of such payments by barring the 
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introduction of evidence of collateral source payments 
made towards any part of a plaintiff’s damages.97 
One argument used to justify the use of the rule is 
that the payments are often gratuitous in nature or stem 
from a pre-existing contractual relationship, and a plaintiff 
should not be penalized for such good fortune.98 
Proponents for the limitation of the rule often argue that 
allowing recovery of collateral source payments allows 
the plaintiff to “double recover.” 99 Some states have 
enacted statutes specifically for the purpose of preventing 
double recovery.100 Other states acknowledge the that 
double recovery may be a windfall for the plaintiff; 
however, a defendant who escapes liability, wholly or 
partially, also enjoys a windfall.101 Because the law must 
sanction one windfall and deny the other, these states opt 
to favor the victim of the wrong as opposed to the 
wrongdoer.102 Others have recognized the double 
recovery as acceptable, so long as the payments are 
coming from someone who is wholly unconnected to the 
defendant.103 The following subsections discuss how 
Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama differ in their 
application of the collateral source rule. 
A. TENNESSEE COLLATERAL SOURCE 
In Tennessee, the collateral source rule was first 
recognized in 1896, when the Tennessee Supreme Court heard 
a case regarding damages caused by a fire that started in one 
business and spread to the adjacent business belonging to the 
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plaintiff. 104 In the landmark case, Anderson v. Miller, the 
plaintiff, being fully insured, received insurance money to 
repair the business.105 The defendants argued that the 
insurance benefits received by the plaintiff diminished the 
damages claim against them.106 They reasoned that the 
insurance money put the plaintiffs back to the place they had 
been prior to the fire, and thus there was no reason to recover 
from the defendants as well.107 The Court disagreed and held 
that the insurance benefits obtained by the plaintiff did not 
affect the defendant’s responsibilities to the plaintiff, and such 
responsibilities would not be taken away or minimized by the 
fact that the plaintiff received the insurance benefits.108 This 
was the beginning of the utilization of the collateral source rule 
in Tennessee.  
After Anderson, Tennessee formally adopted the 
Restatement’s version of the collateral source rule which, in part, 
states “[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured 
party from other sources are not credited against the 
tortfeasor’s liability.”109 Tennessee has continuously upheld the 
rule even though there has been opposition to its application.110  
The Court’s decision in a 1998 case upholding the rule 
emphasized Tennessee’s requirement that damages must be a 
reasonable value of necessary services.111 For a plaintiff to 
recover for services rendered, they must show that the rendered 
services were necessary for the treatment of the injury and the 
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charges for those services were reasonable.112 Once proved 
reasonable and necessary, the defendant is prohibited from 
attempting to prove that the service rendered has been paid or 
will be paid by collateral sources.113 
1. WEST AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The problem of what is reasonable and necessary arises 
in situations where the medical providers are paid less than 
what the services were billed for.114  This occurs generally due 
to contractual agreements between health insurance companies 
and medical providers where the providers will accept a 
discounted rate, and in return, the insurance companies have 
the provider listed as an approved provider under an insured’s 
policy.115 When a service is billed for one amount but is 
considered paid in full after receiving a lower amount than 
what was billed, an issue arises as to what is the reasonable 
charge for the services rendered.116  
In 2014, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed a case 
which centered around the applicability of the reasonable and 
necessary requirement when acting pursuant to the Hospital 
Lien Act.117 The Hospital Lien Act in part states that when a 
person is injured and pursues a claim for damages resulting 
from those injuries, the law requires that the hospital file a lien 
against the claim for all reasonable and necessary charges for 
hospital care and treatment.118 
The plaintiff in West was billed $14,000.00 for hospital 
and a lien was perfected on the personal injury lawsuit in that 
amount.119 The hospital, pursuant to the contractual agreement, 
only billed the plaintiff’s health insurance company for 
$3,000.00 which was paid in full.120 The hospital refused to 
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extinguish the lien, reasoning they were waiting to see whether 
they could recover the non-discounted price from the 
defendants in the case.121 When the plaintiff sued to have the 
lien extinguished, the Court had to determine which amount 
was reasonable; the amount billed to the plaintiff or the amount 
billed to the insurance company.122 
The Court determined that, under the statute, 
“reasonable” was the amount of charges agreed upon by the 
insurance company and the hospital, and not the non-
discounted amount for which the patient would have been 
originally billed.123 The plaintiff’s lien was extinguished due to 
payment in full of the reasonable and necessary charges by her 
insurance company.124  The Court specified that this definition 
of “reasonable” was limited in application to the Hospital Lien 
Act.125  
After West was decided, defense attorneys across the 
state began arguing for an extension of the West decision to the 
definition of “reasonable” in all personal injury cases.126 The 
defendants argued that the plaintiff’s recoverable damages 
should be limited to the benefits actually paid by the insurer.127 
In stark contrast, the plaintiffs sought to recover the full amount 
of their damages, arguing that any reduction in recovery 
resulting from insurance benefits received would be violative 
of the collateral source rule.128 
2. TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE 
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
In its decision in Dedmon v. Steelman, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court clarified that the “holding in West was not 
intended to apply in personal injury cases.”129 The defendant 
wished to limit the plaintiff’s introduction of, and possible 
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recovery of, medical bills to the discounted price paid by the 
plaintiff’s health insurance company, arguing that the decision 
in West should be extended.130 In ruling that West did not 
extend to personal injury cases, the Court outlined the long-
standing existence and enforcement of the collateral source rule 
in Tennessee and emphasized the strong public policy rooted in 
maintaining a defendant’s responsibility for any harm caused 
despite the plaintiff’s receiving collateral benefits.131 
Even though Tennessee upheld the existence of the 
collateral source rule in personal injury cases, the rule has been 
abrogated in regard to medical malpractice claims where the 
costs for the collateral benefits have been or will be paid by 
sources other the plaintiff, in whole or in part.132 The Court has 
noted that because this collateral source exception is in direct 
conflict with the rule that has long been upheld in Tennessee, 
“it must be strictly construed.”133 The Court applied this strict 
construction of the statute in a case where a plaintiff had 
contributed to an insurance plan through his employer and 
those contributions had been used partially to cover the 
plaintiff’s insurance plan through the employer.134 It was held 
that the medical malpractice exception did not apply here 
because the plaintiff partially contributed to the costs of the 
reasonable and necessary medical services by contributing to 
the insurance plan.135 
Absent the medical malpractice exception to the 
collateral source rule, Tennessee has not altered its version of 
the rule and, similar to Georgia, continues to uphold the 
                                                                 
130 Id. at 435. 
131 Id. at 451. 
132 The collateral source rule has been abrogated in regard to medical 
malpractices claims where the collateral benefits will have been paid 
for by governmental or private employers, social security benefits, 
service benefit programs, unemployment benefits, or any other 
source except the asses of the claimants. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-
119 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Reg. Session). 
133 Hunter v. Ura, 163 S.W.3d 686, 711 (Tenn. 2005). 
134 Id.  
135 Id. 
LIMITING PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES  73 
 
collateral payment protections. 
B. GEORGIA COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
While Tennessee strays slightly from the full application 
of the collateral source rule, Georgia strictly adheres to it; 
however, this has not always been the case.  During an early 
movement of tort reform, a law was passed by the Georgia 
legislature which allowed the admission of evidence of 
collateral sources at trial.136 This was eventually challenged and 
deemed unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court.137 The 
Court invalidated the statute, noting that collateral source 
evidence is not only irrelevant but has a strong likelihood of 
being prejudicial.138  
With the statute allowing evidence of collateral sources 
no longer in play, Georgia retracted back to its days of strict 
adherence and continued to uphold the application of the rule 
in tort cases; however, the court refused to apply it in contract 
cases.139 Additionally, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that 
a plaintiff may not recover for medical bills that had previously 
been discharged through bankruptcy.140 The court reasoned 
that discharge through bankruptcy is not a “collateral source” 
at all, as “[t]here is no third party acting as an additional source 
of recovery.”141 It was also mentioned that if allowed, it might 
encourage bankruptcy, which would be against public 
policy.142 With the minor exception for bankruptcy, Georgia 
still follows the common law rule that no collateral source 
evidence will be admissible at trial in an attempt to reduce the 
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plaintiff’s recoverable damages. 
C. ALABAMA COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
In stark contrast to both Tennessee and Georgia, 
Alabama has completely gotten rid of the collateral source rule 
in all civil actions which seek damages.143 This abrogation 
means the defendant can present the discounted bills as a 
defense to the plaintiff’s medical bills being reasonable and 
necessary, which would allow for a reduced recovery. 
Before abolishing the law in 1979, Alabama followed an 
articulated rule that had been set out by the Alabama Supreme 
Court since 1910, which in part stated “[t]he mere fact that the 
insurer has paid the insured cannot affect the action against the 
wrongdoer who has destroyed or injured the property, the 
subject of the insurance.”144 The Alabama Supreme Court 
upheld this rule in Carlisle v. Miller, where the Court held that 
any recovery by a plaintiff from an insurer shall not “affect his 
measure of recovery, and such evidence is not admissible in the 
trial of such cause.”145  
The first piece of legislation abrogating the rule in 
Alabama applied to products liability cases.146 The law 
provided that evidence of the plaintiff’s medical expenses that 
may have been or might have been paid by health insurance 
would be admissible in trial for the purpose of mitigating any 
medical expense damages.147  
Another wave of tort reform came through Alabama in 
the late 1980s, and newly enacted statutes abrogated the 
collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases and in all 
personal injury cases seeking damages for medical expenses.148  
The constitutionality of the statute abrogating the rule 
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in personal injury cases was challenged and deemed 
unconstitutional in 1996.149  The Court noted that the legislature 
failed to provide any support or reasoning for why evidence of 
collateral source payments should now be admitted.150  
Approximately four years later, the Alabama Supreme 
Court found itself reevaluating the constitutionality of the 
statute which abrogated the rule in personal injury cases.151 In 
determining that the statute was constitutional, the court 
explained that “[the reasons we previously held the statute to 
be unconstitutional] deal with the wisdom of legislative policy 
rather than constitutional issues….Matters of policy are for the 
legislature and, whether wise or unwise, legislative policies are 
of no concern to the courts.”152 The Court essentially said that 
the courts have no business making decisions that should be 
made by the state legislature. The Court reversed its prior 
decision that the statute relating to personal injury claims was 
unconstitutional because the legislature had not deemed the 
statute to be unconstitutional.  
The repeal of the collateral source rule in Alabama 
continues today, providing for any evidence of collateral source 
payments to be admissible in trial.  However, the problem lies 
in the fact that “[t]he statutes on their faces make evidence of 
collateral source payments admissible without providing what 
the effect on the law of damages will be.”153  In other words, the 
statute only addresses the rule of evidence concerning the 
admission of medical bills and fails to provide any instruction 
for the jury on how they are to handle the admission of 
collateral source payments in conjunction with the damages 
calculation.   
As seen in the analysis of Tennessee, Georgia, and 
Alabama, each jurisdiction has different rules regarding the 
application of the collateral source rule. A state can have a 
complete abrogation of the rule like Alabama has done, or a 
state could be on the opposite side of the spectrum like Georgia 
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and can choose to fully adhere to the rule.  The fairest 
application seems to be Georgia’s method of full adherence, 
which allows a plaintiff to receive collateral payments without 
the fear of having her damages reduced by the amount of the 
collateral payments.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This analysis of tort reform across the states of 
Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama reveals a wide range of 
decisions that have been made regarding the placement and 
constitutionality of caps on damages as well as the utilization 
of the collateral source rule.  An analysis of these decisions 
uncovers the severe injustice that these limitations create, 
especially in states that lack any evidence or support that the 
limitations are actually furthering their stated purpose of 
helping lower insurance premiums or improving the state’s 
economic development. As seen in both Tennessee and 
Georgia, the collateral source rule has been deeply rooted in 
both the federal and state justice systems. As is the right to a 
trial by jury. Issues such as these, which are embedded within 
the very basis of our justice system cannot continue to be 
limited and abrogated like they have been in Alabama.  The 
personal injury attorneys and trial lawyers associations as well 
as our legislature, regardless of which political party is 
represented, need to form together and continue to lobby 
against these limitations on a plaintiff’s recovery. 
